ABSTRACT In this follow-up to "Five Laws of Politics," I show that the original estimates of electoral outcomes describing the five "laws" hold up with twice the number of elections and three times as many countries as in the original article. The analysis yields long-run equilibrium values for several electoral parameters that set limits to incumbent support in a democracy. The evidence lends additional support to the notion that elections in democracies appear as if governed by "laws of politics."
I
n "Five Laws of Politics" (Cuzán 2015) , an analysis of 426 elections in 23 presidential and parliamentary democracies drawn from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development members and Latin America revealed the following invariant or nearly invariant patterns:
(1) Law of Minority Rule. On average, 75% of the electorate turned out to vote, of whom 42% marked their ballots for the incumbents-the president's or prime minister's party-which yields a support rate of less than one third of the electorate. (2) Law of Incumbent Advantage. Incumbents win reelection 60% of the time. (3) Law of Shrinking Support, also known as "the cost of ruling" Nannestad and Paldam 1999; Wlezien 2017) . The incumbents incur a loss of support between elections averaging 4 percentage points. (4) Law of the 60% Maximum. The incumbent party candidate succeeded at crashing that ceiling in fewer than 3% of cases. (5) Law of Partials. No single party or coalition of parties can harmonize the diversity of interests and opinions of the electorate. The democratic synthesis is produced by competing parties taking turns at governing ). On average, any one party serves two terms for a total of eight years in office.
The purpose of this follow-up article is twofold: (1) to present additional confirmatory evidence in support of the contention that there are, indeed, "laws" of politics 1 ; and (2) to extract theoretical insights from the empirical findings. I argue that democracies appear to exhibit a general tendency toward equilibrium values in electoral outcomes. The findings derive from a dataset composed of twice as many elections (i.e., 971 versus 426) 2 and three times as many countries (i.e., 74 versus 23) as in the original article. 3 To be added to the original dataset, elections generally must have been held in countries in which for at least two decades ending in the most recent year their Freedom House (2018) ratings on political rights and civil liberties were no higher than 4 (i.e., Partly Free). However, in some instances-usually in Africa, where democracies are scarce-this rule was relaxed if no more than in one or two nonelection years one of the ratings reached no higher than five. Figure 1 displays the distribution of most countries across space and region. 4 Also, to avoid losing data on current administrations or governments, if an incumbent party was currently in its third or later term at the time of the analysis, its values on Terms, Outcome, Reign, and Maximum Vote were "right censored." That is, its values on Terms and Reign are counted as of the time they were observed for the analysis because they will not be any lower.
FINDINGS
I now proceed to analyze the data, first as averages over the entire period and then longitudinally, across time.
Statics
The descriptive statistics of the electoral variables are shown in table 1. The first column of data presents values for the entire dataset. These should be compared to those displayed in table 1 in Cuzán (2015, 417) . The averages have budged only slightly, although the variation around the mean values has widened-an understandable difference given the range of democratic development in the countries covered in the more inclusive series. The mean values showing so little difference demonstrates that the original findings are robust with respect to the number and diversity of cases. This suggests that adding more countries or elections is unlikely to alter the parameter estimates. One benefit is that it may bring into relief regional patterns and variations with greater confidence than can be justified at present. Only the few that appear unlikely to be diluted with additional data are mentioned in this article. On average, 75% of eligible voters turn out to vote, casting 40% of their ballots for the incumbents, which amounts to a "support rate" of not quite one third of the electorate (i.e., Law of Minority Rule). When victorious, the in-party typically (1) wins approximately 45% of the vote, which is around 4 percentage points higher than the opposition's share when it prevails; (2) is reelected nearly 60% of the time; and (3) serves two terms lasting about eight years (i.e., Law of Incumbent Advantage). This advantage notwithstanding, incumbents lose about 4 percentage points per term (i.e., Law of Shrinking Support), 5 and in only about 3% of cases does the in-party top the Law of the 60% Maximum. 6 Compared to their counterparts in presidential systems, incumbents in parliamentary democracies face a larger electorate ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... ....
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(i.e., turnout is higher); are reelected more often but with a smaller share of the vote; are constrained by a lower ceiling on that vote (i.e., presidential systems break the 60% ceiling twice as often as parliamentary systems); but incur a smaller loss between elections. Moreover, when the opposition wins, it also takes in a lower fraction of the vote than those in presidential systems. 7 However, there is no difference in the incumbents' share of the vote (win or lose), the number of consecutive terms they serve, or the length of their reigns.
As shown in figure 2, in almost two thirds of the cases, the vote share of incumbents is highest when they first are elected to office; another 25% peak in their first reelection; and only 10% crest in their second or later reelection. Figure 3 paints an even more dramatic picture, depicting a leftward-skewed distribution in which 80% of incumbents manage to obtain no more than 50% of the vote. Beyond that, their numbers fall precipitously. In fact, fewer than 10% take in more than 55% and, as mentioned previously, no more than 3% top 60% of the vote-with almost all of those outliers falling outside the developed democracies, in Africa, Asia, or Latin America. Actually, some in the top 3% reflect opposition boycotts; at the very next contested election, the incumbents' share shrank drastically. Furthermore, in only nine countries does the Incumbent Vote average exceed 50%; all but one (i.e., Australia, 50.2%) are found outside of the developed democracies. 8
Dynamics
The longitudinal behavior of these variables, shown in figure 4 (Turnout and Incumbent Vote) and figure 5 (Incumbent Winning Vote and Opposition Winning Vote), all slightly drift downward across time, although the R-sq. in all is small (≤0.05). Conversely, Incumbent Loss, Terms, and Reign are flat, as shown in figure 6. Turning to the developed democracies only, as a group they show no relationship between time and Turnout, Incumbent Loss, Terms, or Reign. However, figure 7 shows a secular decline among them in the Winning Vote for both the Incumbents and the Opposition, with the more pronounced decrease occurring in the former (R-sq.=0.19 and 0.07, respectively). 9 Although modest, the secular decline in Incumbent Vote in the developed democracies, where elections have been held continuously for three-quarters of a century or longer, may reflect a combination of a breakdown of old-party cohesion, erosion of an old-party brand, and an increasingly divided electorate, which makes it more difficult for erstwhile catchall parties to aggregate interests-probably not a good thing. Or, it may signal a more positive development because in most of these democracies one party was dominant for many years. Taken together, these changes may mean that the political arena in the developed democracies has become more competitive. This may be regarded as a good thing because vigorous competition for votes among parties is a hallmark of modern mass democracy . Which of the two interpretations is closer to or encompasses a larger share of the truth of the matter remains to be seen.
DISCUSSION
The previous analysis suggests that in countries where there is sufficient freedom to contest them, election outcomes gravitate toward a set of parameters describing electoral equilibrium. 10 At equilibrium, the variables measuring incumbent support generally tend toward the following values: Support Rate (33%); Incumbent Vote (40%); Incumbent Winning Vote (45% in parliamentary, 50% in presidential); the ceiling they are highly unlikely to break (60%); Incumbent Loss in percentage points per term (-3 in parliamentary, -6 in presidential); their reelection rate (60% in parliamentary, 50% in presidential); Terms (2); and Reign (8 years). These parameters could be interpreted as the "natural" values toward which democracies incline, fluctuating up and down in the long run. 11 If indeed there are natural or equilibrium values in electoral outcomes, then we would expect democracies that have been around a long time to be closer to them than those that have not. As shown in figure 8 , this appears to be the case. The range of values around the overall average among the newer democracies (i.e., those with fewer elections) is 1.5 to 2.0 times as large as that of the older democracies. (Outliers 
Map of Elections
The purpose of this follow-up article is twofold: (1) to present additional confirmatory evidence in support of the contention that there are, indeed, "laws" of politics; and (2) to extract theoretical insights from the empirical findings.
above the mean are mostly African and those below it are a mix of Latin American and post-Communist European.) Furthermore, as shown in figure 9, all regional trend lines in Incumbent Vote and Incumbent Winning Vote converge. It is as if time acts as a funnel, drawing toward the equilibrium level what initially had been widely dispersed country outcomes. From figure 8, we can surmise that the threshold for reaching the equilibrium values appears to be somewhere between 10 and 15 consecutive elections. Held on average every four years, it may take about 40 years for the average values of at least some of the new democracies to approach equilibrium. Nevertheless, the process may proceed faster in some and slower in other democracies. It depends on the strength of friction encountered from electoral rules (Carey 2018; Shugart and Taagepera 2017) and from country-specific contexts including political culture, recent history, and exceptional leaders (Colomer 2010) .
Be that as it may, the evolution might proceed more or less as follows. The initial elections may favor one party above all others due to, say, the prestige of its founding leader or its history in the fight for independence or founding of democracy. Following the death or retirement of the leader or particular failures in policy, infighting among rival claims to the presidency or the premiership rooted in ideas, interests, and personal ambition would ensue, causing a split. 12 Starting at the other end, political entrepreneurs would seek to merge ideologically close parties that divide the vote of a large minority or plurality of the electorate into a larger, more competitive organization or alliance. We do occasionally observe party splits, mergers, and short-term as well as enduring alliances in various countries from time to time. 13 
CONCLUSION
This analysis appears to uphold the claim that elections in democracies are governed by a number of "laws" of politics constraining the share of support and, therefore, the time that an incumbent party can expect to exercise power in a single stretch. Although these "laws" may be largely a function of mechanical or statistical features of democratic institutions (Lebo and Norpoth 2007; Norpoth 2014; Shugart and Taagepera 2017; Stokes and Iverson 1962) , their operation in specific cases is mediated by particular electoral rules and country-specific contexts, which are the product of history, culture, and political leadership. From the analysis, we may draw a specific recommendation for institutional reform: more frequent elections should aid the equilibrium-seeking (13) 75 (13) 71 (13) Support Rate 30 (11) 30 (11) 28 (11) Incumbent Vote 40 (13) 40 (12) 41 (15) Incumbent Winning Vote 46 (11) 44 (11) 50 (9) Maximum Incumbent Vote 54 (14) 51 (15) 57 (11) Incumbent Loss -4.4 (10 ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... ....
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Figure 4
Turnout and Incumbent Vote Figure 3 Incumbent Vote Frequency Distribution processes of democracies. 14 Parliamentary democracies should consider holding elections no less often than every three years and presidential democracies no more than every four years, including off-year elections for the legislature halfway through the presidential term, as in the United States. .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. ....
Figure 5
Winning Vote: Incumbent and Opposition Figure 6 Incumbent Loss, Terms, and Reign the data collected during 2018. I also am grateful to The University of West Florida for its generous support and benign academic environment. The usual caveat applies: any errors of fact or interpretation or deficiencies in presentation are entirely my own. n
N O T E S
1. I put the word "law" inside quotation marks in deference to those who are skeptical that a relationship as strong as a scientific law is operative in politics.
As in the original article, Wikipedia was the source of election data. On the use of this resource for academic purposes, see Brown (2011 ), Cassel (2018 , and Tomaszewski and Macdonald (2016) .
2. Actually, the calculation of Incumbent Vote or Outcome omits 89 elections because they were the first in a country's series (85) or because the previous winner was an independent candidate or head of a party that disappeared or did not contest the election. In a few cases, it was clear that the incumbent party had lost; this was noted in the Outcome, but the vote could not be determined.
As discussed in the original article, some countries presented special challenges due to highly fractured party systems and changes of government between elections.
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Figure 8
Incumbent Vote by Number of Elections 6. Although these empirical estimates are inductively arrived at, Colomer (2016) constructed a mathematical model that proceeds from a country's population to assembly size. Then, taking into account district magnitude, he arrived at the number of parliamentary parties and the size of the largest party-usually but not always the prime minister's party-which is 40%. Taagepera (2018) suggested a simple logical way for arriving at other estimates. Theoretically, the maximum value of Turnout is 100% (the actual in the data is 97% in Austria in 1949 and 1953) . At the opposite end, it can be argued that no democracy could sustain itself for long if turnout fell below 50%. Taking the mean between the two extremes yields 75%, which is almost the same as the actual overall value shown in table 1 (Taagepera 2018 .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. ....
Figure 9
Convergence among Regions something analogous to anemia. Happily, however, fewer than 5% of the observations of this variable fell below 50%, spread across 15 countries-most of which did so only once or twice, Colombia and Poland excepted. Therefore, although it is not an absolute or theoretical minimum, a 50% floor on Turnout seems about right. A similar calculation applied to Outcome yields a mean value of 0.5-again, this is close to the actual overall value. Regarding Terms and Reign, the theoretical minimum would be 1; however, Reign could be only a few days, weeks, or months-but there is no theoretical maximum for either variable. Taking the actual maxima (i.e., 13 for Terms and 54 for Reign), the geometric mean for each yields 3.6 (versus actual overall of 2.2) and 7.3 (versus 8.4), respectively. For his part, Gelman (2018) suggested that the 60% maximum reflects the fact that any attempt to achieve more than that would take the party so far from the median voter that one or more rival parties would move in to its left or right, as the case may be. In fact, as shown herein, most incumbents do not receive much more than 50% of the vote; therefore, this represents a hard constraint and is in line with "the law of partials."
7. All of these differences are statistically significant at 0.05 or less. Technically, statistical significance has no meaning because the elections analyzed constitute a population, not a sample. Nevertheless, in conformity with convention, it is reported here.
8. The opposite end, averaging less than 25% of the vote, is occupied almost exclusively (Guatemala is the only exception) by new, post-Communist European democracies characterized by highly fractured party systems (Cabada, Hlousek, and Jurek 2014) .
9. That the incumbents' victory margin shrunk relative to that of the opposition does not negate the Law of Incumbent Advantage because the gap has not been closed and Terms and Reign show no change over the same period. Time may tell whether Colomer's (2012) pronouncement that the incumbent advantage had vanished turns out to have been prescient or in error.
